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In the past three decades, conservation servitudes–also 
known as conservation easements–have emerged as an 
important means of preserving lands of ecological, scenic, 
cultural, and historic value.1  Although exact figures are 
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1 See Gerald Korngold, Solving the Contentious Issues of Private Conservation 
Easements: Promoting Flexibility for the Future and Engaging the Public Land Use 
Process, 2007 UTAH L. REV. 1039, 1048 (2007) (“[C]onservation easements are 
becoming the conservation tool of choice.”); Dominic P. Parker, Land Trusts and 
the Choice to Conserve Land with Full Ownership or Conservation Easements, 44 
NAT. RESOURCES J. 483, 516 (2004) (reporting that a survey of land trusts reveals  
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impossible to come by, it is estimated that more than nine 
million acres in the United States are subject to conservation 
servitudes held by land trusts and other organizations.2  The 
explosive success of this novel approach to land preservation has 
led to an increasing stream of questions and concerns.  Once 
lavished with near unqualified praise, conservation servitudes 
are now acknowledged–even by fervent supporters–to have 
the potential to cause serious problems.3  The hard question we 
now face is whether these instruments are fundamentally sound, 
suffering from nothing more serious than the inevitable growing 
pains of any legal innovation, or whether their flaws are of such 
character and magnitude that an overhaul of conservation law 
and practice is in order. 
In this Point-Counterpoint exchange, I stake out the position 
that there is cause for grave skepticism about the net social 
benefits of conservation servitudes.  Key to the appeal of these 
instruments is the conviction that current landowners, in 
conjunction with land trusts and other organizations, have the 
ability to identify lands worthy of eternal protection from 
development and the moral right (indeed, perhaps even the 
obligation) to entrench the judgments and preferences of today’s 
decision makers by severely constricting the choices of later 
generations.4  This belief is misguided.  Even worse, its embrace 
 
that “conservation easements are becoming more prevalent relative to outright 
ownership” of conserved properties). 
2 Korngold, supra note 1, at 1046–48; see also Nancy A. McLaughlin, 
Conservation Easements–A Troubled Adolescence, 26 J. LAND RESOURCES & 
ENVTL. L. 47, 50–51 (2005). 
3 See, e.g., JEFF PIDOT, REINVENTING CONSERVATION EASEMENTS 2–3 (2005) 
(arguing that the laws and social practices that govern conservation servitudes 
require reform to ensure that their creation and enforcement serve the public 
interest); see also Korngold, supra note 1, at 1057 (noting that conservation 
easements “come with costs that must be addressed”); McLaughlin, supra note 2, at 
47 (acknowledging that with the “increased popularity” of conservation easements 
“have come increased reports of abuse”); Anna Vinson, Re-Allocating the 
Conservation Landscape: Conservation Easements and Regulation Working in 
Concert, 18 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 273 (2007) (discussing the possibility that 
the use of conservation easements to preserve land will undermine public support 
for traditional environmental regulation). 
4 Compare Julia D. Mahoney, Perpetual Restrictions on Land and the Problem of 
the Future, 88 VA. L. REV. 739 (2002) (arguing that conservation servitudes “create 
ecological, legal, and institutional problems” that may outweigh any benefits “for 
later generations”), with James L. Olmsted, Counterpoint, Representing 
Nonconcurrent Generations: The Problem of Now, 23 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 449,  
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threatens to create a legacy of sclerotic land use restrictions.  
Instead of striving to memorialize early twenty-first-century 
views of how humans should interact with nature, I suggest we 
should devote our energies to crafting policies and institutions 
that can readily adapt to changes in the physical world, advances 
in scientific knowledge, and shifts in cultural values. 
I 
CONSERVATION SERVITUDES: TRADITION AND EXPERIMENT 
Conservation servitudes are partial interests in land.  By 
transferring a particular type of nonpossessory interest (a 
servitude) to a land trust, other nonprofit organization, or, less 
frequently, a government entity, real property owners bind 
themselves and their successors to refrain from specified land 
uses.5  Some conservation servitudes also contain affirmative 
promises that landowners will further preservation objectives.6  
The provisions of conservation servitudes vary widely, for the 
simple reason that these instruments are employed to further a 
variety of goals dear to present day conservationists, including 
the promotion of farming and ranching, the preservation of old-
growth forest, and providing habitats for endangered species.7  
What conservation servitudes all have in common is that they 
aim to protect lands of ecological, scenic, cultural, and historic 
distinction by banning selected, but far from uniform, forms of 
 
489 (2008) (“[F]uture generations will thank us . . . for using perpetual conservation 
easements to protect the last unique and irreplaceable traces of nature’s grandeur    
. . . instead [of] replacing the remaining enclaves of undisturbed nature with our 
fungible structures of concrete, steel, and glass.”). 
5 See generally PROTECTING THE LAND: CONSERVATION EASEMENTS PAST, 
PRESENT, AND FUTURE (Julie Ann Gustanski & Roderick H. Squires eds., 2000). 
6 See Todd D. Mayo, A Holistic Examination of the Law of Conservation 
Easements, in PROTECTING THE LAND: CONSERVATION EASEMENTS PAST, 
PRESENT, AND FUTURE, supra note 5. 
7 See James Boyd et al., The Law and Economics of Habitat Conservation: 
Lessons from an Analysis of Easement Acquisitions, 19 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 209 
(2000); see also PIDOT, supra note 3, at 8–9 (“It is often stated that each 
conservation easement should be unique and negotiated to address the parties’ 
particular specifications. . . . By all accounts, conservation easements have become 
increasingly dense and intricate instruments.”); Julia D. Mahoney, Forest 
Conservation Easements: Some Questions and Concerns, THE CONSULTANT, 2005, 
at 26. 
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development.8  As compensation for surrendering some of their 
property rights, holders of burdened properties receive federal, 
state, or local tax benefits or, less often, outright payments from 
governmental or nonprofit entities.9  Conveyors of conservation 
servitudes remain in possession of their lands and typically retain 
all other rights and obligations of ownership, including powers to 
transfer, lease, and mortgage their properties.10 
Most conservation servitudes are unlimited in term.  This 
merits emphasis, for a crucial component of the emotional pull 
of these instruments is the claim that the development 
restrictions imposed by the present generation will determine 
land uses not just for now but for all time.  Land trusts and other 
conservation organizations work hard to foment the expectation 
that, absent highly unusual circumstances, conservation 
easements will remain in effect in perpetuity.11  The strong 
inclination of landowners to impose restrictions with no time 
limits is reinforced by practical considerations: only property 
holders who transfer perpetual interests are eligible for most of 
the available tax breaks and other financial benefits that flow 
from the transfer of conservation easements.12 
Conservation servitudes are of fairly recent vintage and 
represent a significant innovation in the law of real property.13  
 
8 See Julia D. Mahoney, The Illusion of Perpetuity and the Preservation of 
Privately Owned Lands, 44 NAT. RESOURCES J. 573 (2004); see also UNIF. 
CONSERVATION EASEMENT ACT § 1(1), 12 U.L.A. 174 (1981). 
9 See Mahoney, supra note 4, at 742. 
10 Id. 
11 See, e.g., Finger Lakes Land Trust, Donation of a Conservation Easement, 
http://www.fllt.org/protect_your_land/easement.php (last visited Jan. 3, 2009) 
(“Donation of a conservation easement protects your land permanently while 
keeping it in private ownership. . . . Conservation easements are designed to 
conserve forever the important resource values of each property.”); Mont. Ass’n of 
Land Trusts, About Conservation Easements, http://www 
.montanalandtrusts.org/conservationeasements (last visited Jan. 3, 2009) 
(“[E]asements follow the land forever.”); see also Mahoney, supra note 8, at 597–98 
(“[M]ost organizations that hold conservation easements have taken the position 
that these instruments should be amended sparingly, if at all, and then only to 
further conservation goals.”). 
12 See Federico Cheever & Nancy McLaughlin, Why Environmental Lawyers 
Should Know (and Care) About Land Trusts and Their Private Conservation 
Transactions, 34 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,223, 10,225–26 (2004). 
13 See Gerald Korngold, Privately Held Conservation Servitudes: A Policy 
Analysis in the Context of In Gross Real Covenants and Easements, 63 TEX. L. REV. 
433, 435–36 (1984). 
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Traditionally, Anglo-American law has been sparing in its 
willingness to enforce promises regarding property use that 
purport to bind the successors in interest of an original 
contracting party.  As the Supreme Court of Virginia observed 
in a recent decision: 
 At common law, an owner of land was not permitted at his 
pleasure to create easements of every novel character and 
annex them to the land so that the land would be burdened 
with the easement when the land was conveyed to subsequent 
grantees.  Rather, the landowner was limited to the creation of 
easements permitted by the common law or by statute.14 
In particular, courts construed common law rules as imposing 
severe limitations on negative easements, which, unlike ordinary 
easements conveying rights to enter onto or use land owned by 
another, grant their holders rights to prevent land uses that 
contravene the terms of the easement.15  Only a handful of 
negative easements were given effect: those created to ensure 
adequate light and air, to protect the flow of artificial streams, 
and to provide lateral and subjacent support.16  Courts were also 
reluctant to recognize servitudes “in gross.”  That is, servitudes 
not appurtenant to specific estates in land but instead inuring to 
the benefit of individuals qua individuals.17  This practice was 
often justified by the claim that such servitudes interfered with 
“the free use of land.”18  Because conservation easements have 
characteristics of negative easements and are (except in rare 
cases) held in gross, for many years there were serious doubts 
about whether courts would enforce them.19 
 
14 United States v. Blackman, 613 S.E.2d 442, 446 (Va. 2005) (citation omitted); 
see also Andrew Dana & Michael Ramsey, Conservation Easements and the 
Common Law, 8 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 2, 12–17 (1989). 
15 See Blackman, 613 S.E.2d at 445–46. 
16 See THOMAS W. MERRILL & HENRY E. SMITH, PROPERTY: PRINCIPLES AND 
POLICIES 977 (2007). 
17 See Federico Cheever, Public Good and Private Magic in the Law of Land 
Trusts and Conservation Easements: A Happy Present and a Troubled Future, 73 
DENV. U. L. REV. 1077, 1081 (1996). 
18 Blackman, 613 S.E.2d at 446. 
19 See Korngold, supra note 1, at 1048; see also Susan F. French, Perpetual Trusts, 
Conservation Servitudes, and the Problem of the Future, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 2523, 
2524 n.2 (2006) (“Although widespread concerns about the potential invalidity of 
conservation easements led to legislation authorizing them, there are so few cases 
involving conservation servitudes that it is difficult to say with confidence that  
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As time wore on, however, there was a marked trend toward 
relaxing the strict, often inflexible, common law limitations on 
servitudes and permitting owners to exercise a greater degree of 
control over the future uses of their holdings.20  A movement to 
enact laws explicitly authorizing conservation servitudes began 
in the late 1950s and accelerated in the wake of the Uniform 
Commission on State Laws’ 1981 approval of the Uniform 
Conservation Easement Act.21  Today, “easement enabling” 
statutes are in force in all fifty states, as well as in the District of 
Columbia.22  At around the time of the passage of a number of 
these statutes, Congress substantially expanded the federal tax 
benefits available to donors of conservation servitudes.23  These 
federal tax benefits have been supplemented by state and local 
tax benefits, as well as other financial incentives.24  The effect of 
these modifications of property and tax law has been nothing 
short of seismic; between 1980 and 2005, the number of acres in 
the United States subject to conservation servitudes held by land 
trusts alone increased nearly fifty fold.25 
II 
TROUBLE IN PARADISE? 
At first, conservation servitudes inspired little but accolades.  
Hailed as “unique, dynamic tools”26 and even described as 
 
courts would not have recognized their validity when increasing environmental 
concerns made their utility apparent.”). 
20 See Molly Shaffer Van Houweling, The New Servitudes, 96 GEO. L.J. 885, 888 
(2008) (“[T]he trend has been toward recognition of a wider variety of servitudes 
and abandonment of some of the more convoluted common law doctrinal 
requirements.”). 
21 See Mahoney, supra note 4, at 749–50. 
22 Nancy A. McLaughlin, Condemning Conservation Easements: Protecting the 
Public Interest and Investment in Conservation, 41 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1897, 1900 
(2008). 
23 See Dana Joel Gattuso, Conservation Easements: The Good, the Bad and the 
Ugly, NAT’L POL’Y ANALYSIS (Nat’l Ctr. for Pub. Pol’y Res., Wash., D.C.), May 
2008, http://www.nationalcenter.org/NPA569.html. 
24 ROB ALDRICH & JAMES WYERMAN, 2005 NATIONAL LAND TRUST CENSUS 
REPORT 8 (Chris Soto & Anne W. Garnett eds., 2006), available at http://www 
.landtrustalliance.org/about-us/land-trust-census/2005-report.pdf. 
25 Id. 
26 Jessica E. Jay, Land Trust Risk Management of Legal Defense and 
Enforcement of Conservation Easements: Potential Solutions, 6 ENVTL. LAW. 441, 
451 (2000). 
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“magic,”27 the new instruments were deemed both innovative 
and unproblematic.28  But, in the past five years or so, 
enthusiasm has been tempered by a mounting realization that 
conservation servitudes have real drawbacks.29  Concerns have 
been voiced that lack of coordination among the nonprofit and 
governmental organizations that hold conservation servitudes 
will result in a hodgepodge of restrictions.  In the words of 
property law scholar Gerald Korngold: 
 Private groups have virtually unlimited discretion in 
purchasing or accepting donations of easements and do not 
have to follow standards or a plan in making such 
determinations. . . . 
 Moreover, private organizations do not accumulate 
conservation easements pursuant to a public land use plan.  
This can easily result in a patchwork of easements that do not 
add up to an effective community-wide preservation plan.30 
Worries about the possible antisocial effects of privately made 
conservation decisions are compounded by the growing 
recognition that the agendas of land trusts, other conservation 
organizations, and individual landowners are often in conflict 
with the needs of the public.31  The clash between the interests of 
conservation groups and their generally well-heeled 
constituencies on the one hand and the general welfare on the 
other is especially glaring with respect to the issue of affordable 
housing.  Because conservation easements can function as 
 
27 Cheever, supra note 17, at 1078. 
28 See Mahoney, supra note 4, at 761; see also Gattuso, supra note 23. 
29 Among the few early detractors was property rights activist James Burling, 
who argued that conservation servitudes were in conflict with long-standing 
principles and practices discouraging property owners from exercising “dead hand” 
control.  See James Burling, The Folly of Conservation Easements (1998) 
(unpublished manuscript, on file with the Journal of Environmental Law and 
Litigation). 
30 Korngold, supra note 1, at 1059 (footnote omitted); see also PIDOT, supra note 
3, at 15 (“Most conservation easements are driven by ad hoc forces and 
opportunities. . . . [and are] not integrated into public planning processes . . . .”); 
Heidi J. Albers & Amy W. Ando, Could State-Level Variation in the Number of 
Land Trusts Make Economic Sense?, 79 LAND ECON. 311, 312 (2003) (concluding 
that the absence of concerted action by land trusts may have detrimental 
consequences). 
31 See Christopher M. Anderson & Jonathan R. King, Equilibrium Behavior in 
the Conservation Easement Game, 80 LAND ECON. 355, 355 (2004) (“[S]ince the 
conservation decision is private rather than public, there is no guarantee that the 
most socially valuable land will be conserved . . . .”). 
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growth controls, their imposition threatens to drive up the price 
of housing.  Consequently, conservation servitudes may have the 
unfortunate side effect of creating redoubts for the affluent.32 
Potential harms to the populace extend beyond making it 
harder to find a place to live.  A flurry of press reports, most 
notably a series of articles published in the Washington Post, 
have raised the specter that donations of conservation servitudes 
may serve as a highly effective vehicle for tax abuse or even 
outright fraud.33  Although the danger that donors might reap 
illegitimate benefits by overstating the value of their surrendered 
property interests was both foreseeable and foreseen,34 the news 
that conservation servitudes are being used for dubious purposes 
has tarnished their once sterling public image.35 
Conservation easements have also begun to stir unease among 
advocates of strong government power to regulate owners’ uses 
of their lands.  The spread of the “voluntary approach,” it is 
feared, threatens to “undermine the viability of the regulatory 
approach” to preventing land development.36  Last but not least, 
a few proponents of conservation servitudes have begun to 
admit that the perpetual terms of these instruments might lead 
 
32 See PIDOT, supra note 3, at 34; see also Korngold, supra note 1, at 1060–61. 
33 See Joe Stephens & David B. Ottaway, Developers Find Payoff in Preservation, 
WASH. POST, Dec. 21, 2003, at A1; see also Margaret Jackson, Subpoenas Issued 
Over Easements, DENV. POST, Nov. 21, 2007, at C1 (detailing investigations by 
Colorado officials of inflated appraisals of servitudes donated pursuant to the 
state’s conservation program); Jerd Smith & Burt Hubbard, Abuses Taint Land 
Deals: Conservation Easements Approved for Pricey Subdivisions, Fairways, Small 
Parcels, ROCKY MOUNTAIN NEWS (Colo.), Feb. 9, 2008, at 19 (“An innovative state 
law designed to preserve Colorado’s scenic open spaces and working ranches has, in 
dozens of cases, been used to protect everything from multimillion-dollar home 
sites in gated communities to tiny pieces of land slated for oil and gas 
development.”); Joe Stephens & David B. Ottaway, Nonprofit Sells Scenic Acreage 
to Allies at a Loss: Buyers Gain Tax Breaks with Few Curbs on Land Use, WASH. 
POST, May 6, 2003, at A1. 
34 See Miscellaneous Tax Bills: Hearing on H.R. 3874, H.R. 4103, H.R. 4503, H.R. 
4611, H.R. 4634, H.R. 4968, and H.R. 5391 Before the Subcomm. on Select Revenue 
Measures of the H. Comm. on Ways & Means, 96th Cong. 12 (1979) (statement of 
Daniel I. Halperin, Deputy Assistant Sec’y, Treasury Dep’t). 
35 See McLaughlin, supra note 2, at 52–54. 
36 John D. Echeverria, Regulating Versus Paying Land Owners to Protect the 
Environment, 26 J. LAND RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 1, 2 (2005); see also Vinson, 
supra note 3, at 299. 
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to trouble and that amendment or even termination will be 
warranted in a number of instances.37 
Interestingly, this cascade of difficulties has yet to spur 
supporters to question the basic idea of conservation servitudes.  
Rather, the typical response is to confess that things are not 
working out as originally envisioned and insist that the problems 
that have arisen are soluble.38  This “mend it, don’t end it” 
attitude has fueled a steady supply of detailed prescriptions for 
reform.  Increased government involvement and transparency 
are offered as antidotes to the self-interested conduct of land 
trusts and private property owners.39  Inflated valuations of 
donated easements are to be checked by beefing up enforcement 
mechanisms40 and adjusting the available tax incentives.41  And 
the problem of perpetuity is said to be not much of a problem 
after all, based on the theory that old, established common law 
doctrines such as cy pres are bound to evolve in a way that will 
ensure that bad conservation easements are modified or 
extinguished.42 
 
37 See, e.g., PIDOT, supra note 3; Nancy A. McLaughlin, Rethinking the Perpetual 
Nature of Conservation Easements, 29 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 421, 425–26 (2005). 
38 See, e.g., Korngold, supra note 1, at 1043 (arguing that the threats posed by 
conservation easements “can be mitigated . . . and the value of private conservation 
enhanced, if legislators and courts follow” certain principles “to implement needed 
reforms”); see also McLaughlin, supra note 2, at 55 (“Despite the problems that 
have arisen . . . if reforms can be successfully implemented, conservation easements 
can not only emerge from their troubled adolescence to take their appropriate adult 
role in the panoply of land conservation techniques, but also may act as a significant 
transformative force.”). 
39 See, e.g., PIDOT, supra note 3. 
40 See Stephen J. Small, Proper–and Improper–Deductions for Conservation 
Easement Donations, Including Developer Donations, 105 TAX NOTES 217, 223–24 
(2004). 
41 See McLaughlin, supra note 2, at 54–55. 
42 See McLaughlin, supra note 37, at 520 (“Applying the doctrine of cy pres to 
conservation easements . . . [could vindicate] society’s interest in ensuring that 
assets perpetually devoted to charitable purposes continue to provide benefits to 
the public.”); see also French, supra note 19, at 2535 (“Existing doctrines can be 
used and extended to solve many problems that are likely to arise [from 
conservation servitudes], but more will be needed.”). 
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III 
THE CONCEPTUAL FLAW OF CONSERVATION SERVITUDES 
For all their erudition and ingenuity, none of the remedies 
prescribed for the maladies of conservation servitudes address 
the conceptual flaw that lies at the heart of these instruments: 
their explicit aim of severely constraining the choices of later 
generations is impossible to justify.  The attraction of 
conservation servitudes stems in large measure from the 
conviction that not only do some tracts of land deserve to remain 
forever in (roughly) their current state but that the present 
generation has the skills to identify them.43  Moreover, the 
generations to come are assumed to be so incapable of ordering 
their own affairs that today’s conservationists are right to take 
aggressive measures to ensure that what is cherished now will be 
“preserved” forever.44  In sum, conservation servitudes are 
intended to accomplish nothing less ambitious than permanent 
land use planning. 
Seeking to freeze the lawful uses of large quantities of land 
might make some sense if nature, scientific knowledge, and 
societal values were static.  But that is not the world we live in.  
Far from being equilibrial, the natural world changes 
constantly.45  And not only is nature dynamic but, as an ever-
increasing body of scientific research tells us, throughout the 
world’s history massive transformations have occurred both 
gradually and abruptly.46  Species expand, contract, and migrate. 
Rivers vary their paths and dry up.  Earthquakes and volcanic 
eruptions reconfigure topography and even create new land.  
Many of these changes are the product of human activity, which 
has increased in magnitude and impact since the Industrial 
Revolution.47 
 
43 See supra notes 11–12 and accompanying text. 
44 See Mahoney, supra note 4, at 740. 
45 See id. at 753–57. 
46 See generally EUGENE LINDEN, THE WINDS OF CHANGE: CLIMATE, 
WEATHER, AND THE DESTRUCTION OF CIVILIZATIONS (2006); Jonathan 
Overpeck, Climate Surprises, in FORCES OF CHANGE: A NEW VIEW OF NATURE 33 
(2000). 
47 See PAUL R. EHRLICH & ANNE H. EHRLICH, ONE WITH NINEVEH: POLITICS, 
CONSUMPTION AND THE HUMAN FUTURE 21 (2004) (“Homo Sapiens has now 
become a truly global geographical force. . . . [I]t has changed the amount and 
patterns of light reflected back into space from Earth’s surface, altered vast  
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This continual change means that “preserved” lands may fail 
to continue to exhibit the features and generate the 
environmental and other benefits that spurred preservation in 
the first place.  Yet, the information furnished by land trusts and 
other easement advocates is oddly silent on the subject of the 
dynamism of the natural world.  Indeed, to judge from 
descriptions of the virtues of conservation servitudes, putting in 
place institutional bars on development is sufficient to ensure 
that protected lands will remain forever “whole and intact” in 
their present condition.48  In articulating this vision of what 
conservation servitudes can accomplish, land trusts and others 
unwittingly endorse the venerable but outmoded ecological 
paradigm that holds that so long as humans do not meddle with 
nature, she will remain in “balance.”49  This error fuels the 
widely held but misguided conviction that by roping off vast 
quantities of undeveloped acreage we can ensure future 
generations will have an adequate supply of ecologically 
valuable lands. 
To be sure, supporters of conservation easements are hardly 
alone in their attachment to the idea that nature as they know it 
can last forever.  As biologist Daniel Botkin notes, even though 
the dynamic model has prevailed among ecologists, “the balance 
of nature idea is alive and well, and infiltrates proposals for 
conservation as well as management” practices.50  Nevertheless, 
the ready acceptance by conservationists of an inaccurate 
conception of how the world works raises the troubling prospect 
 
biogeochemical cycles that circulate the elements upon which our lives depend, 
[and] freed many minerals from Earth’s crust at rates comparable to or even 
exceeding those of natural processes such as wind and water erosion . . . .”); see also 
JAMES GUSTAVE SPETH, RED SKY AT MORNING: AMERICA AND THE CRISIS OF 
THE GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT 13–14 (2d ed. 2005) (detailing the “phenomenal” 
expansion of “human enterprise in the twentieth century” that led “traditional 
pollutants like soot, sulfur oxides, and sewage” to grow from “modest quantities to 
huge ones”). 
48 Mont. Ass’n of Land Trusts, supra note 11. 
49 See Daniel B. Botkin, The Nature of Change, in FORCES OF CHANGE: A NEW 
VIEW OF NATURE, supra note 46, at 15 (“Throughout the history of western 
civilization, for several thousand years, people have generally believed that there 
existed a great balance of nature, that nature, left alone, would inevitably achieve a 
permanent form and a constant structure.”). 
50 Id. at 18. 
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that the well-being of future generations is being subordinated to 
the illusions of the present one. 
The fact that only recently did we figure out that nature is not 
stable and predictable underscores the limits and mutability of 
our scientific understanding.51  Even if land trusts and other 
conservation organizations assiduously strive to incorporate 
science into their preservation decisions, it may do them little 
good, for the reality is that right now we are struggling to acquire 
fundamental knowledge about many ecological processes.52  For 
instance, while we grasp that forest-atmosphere interactions can 
“amplify or dampen climate change arising from anthropogenic 
greenhouse gas emission,”53 our knowledge of how and to what 
extent forests influence climate is still too primitive to enable us 
to make comprehensive recommendations regarding land use.54  
In short, there is every reason to conclude that even the latest, 
most sophisticated research is not up to the task of determining 
how lands should be used for all eternity. 
As with the complexity and disequilibrium of nature, the 
nascent state of ecological science goes unmentioned in 
materials promoting conservation servitudes.  Instead, the 
impression conveyed is one of serene confidence that the right 
restrictions are being imposed on the right properties.55  The 
eagerness of today’s conservationists to control the use of land 
by later generations grows even more puzzling if we take into 
account the common belief, which seems close to 
incontrovertible, that ecological knowledge is more likely to be 
 
51 See LINDEN, supra note 46, at 4. 
Until very recently, climate has been viewed as static.  It was only in the mid 
nineteenth century that scientists discovered the wrenching changes of the ice 
ages, but even after that, the prevailing attitude was that the present 10,000-
year warm period that gave rise to civilization was monotonously stable. 
Id. 
52 See Mary Jane Angelo, Embracing Uncertainty, Complexity, and Change: An 
Eco-Pragmatic Reinvention of a First-Generation Environmental Law, 33 ECOLOGY 
L.Q. 105, 109 (2006) (“Science has only scratched the surface of understanding 
complex ecological systems.”). 
53 See Gordon B. Bonan, Forests and Climate Change: Forcings, Feedback and the 
Climate Benefits of Forests, 320 SCIENCE 1444, 1448 (2008). 
54 See id. at 1449 (“As the climate benefits of forests become better understood, 
land-use policies can be crafted to mitigate climate change.”). 
55 See generally RICHARD BREWER, CONSERVANCY: THE LAND TRUST 
MOVEMENT IN AMERICA (2003). 
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gained than lost.  This means that future decision makers will 
have access to superior information.  Unless there is cause to 
believe that later generations will have vastly inferior analytic 
skills–a claim that has not, so far as I know, been advanced in 
defense of conservation servitudes or, for that matter, in any 
other context–the probable increase in future ecological 
knowledge militates for entrusting future generations with more 
authority rather than less. 
Also hard to predict are changes in social values. 56  Here, we 
can only speculate about how future eyes will view the 
landscapes that inspire early twenty-first-century conservation 
efforts.  What we judge worth preserving inevitably reflects, in 
no small measure, contemporary attitudes about what is 
beautiful, useful, or of historic merit.  If the past is any guide, 
tastes will shift and judgments will be revisited, rendering at least 
some of today’s preservation efforts outdated or discomfiting.57  
One can imagine, for example, that future generations might be 
disinclined to idealize pastoral landscapes and ways of life and 
be baffled that late twentieth- and early twenty-first-century 
Americans were willing to devote substantial resources to 
shielding farms and ranches from the market forces that 
threatened to convert them into residential communities and 
commercial sites.  Alternatively, innovations in zoning and other 
land use regulation may prove so successful that our successors 
will have greater confidence in the capacity of government 
decision makers to decide which lands should be preserved or 
developed and marvel at our determination to supplement 
government regulations with privately ordered prohibitions on 
subdivisions, shopping centers, and selected other forms of 
development. 
Regrettably, advocates of conservation servitudes fail even to 
acknowledge the prospect that later preferences will diverge 
from ours.  Instead, their working assumption appears to be that 
our descendants will share our vision of the good life.  This belief 
enables conservationists to make preservation decisions on the 
basis of their own emotional reactions.  But it also has a 
downside, even for conservationists themselves.  In declining to 
put forth serious effort to imagine alternative reactions to the 
 
56 See Mahoney, supra note 8, at 587–89. 
57 See Mahoney, supra note 4, at 759–60. 
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natural world, they sidestep the challenging but rewarding task 
of discerning the probable range of the values and needs of 
future generations.58 
IV 
IN SEARCH OF A NEW CONSERVATION ETHIC 
None of this is to argue that no conservation servitudes yield 
any present or future benefits.  That the architecture of 
conservation easements embodies fundamental 
misapprehensions about how the natural world and human 
culture function does not mean that their imposition cannot 
provide ecological and other amenities.  A crucial issue, of 
course, is whether it is plausible that through blind luck an ill-
conceived institutional innovation will turn out to do more good 
than harm.  Ultimately, this is an empirical question, but so far 
there are no signs that good fortune will counteract bad design. 
Nor do I claim that ill-advised or obsolete conservation 
servitudes will necessarily last forever.  No matter what land 
trusts and other conservation organizations tell their 
constituencies and the public, future generations will retain 
ultimate control over land use, for no institutional structure 
imposed by the present day actors is immune from overhaul by 
those who follow.59  I do argue that the potential problems 
caused by the durability of conservation easements tend to be 
downplayed or ignored because defenders of conservation 
servitudes are too quick to assume that dismantling institutional 
barriers to development will be cheap and simple.60  Such 
optimism, I maintain, is unwarranted.  Terminating or amending 
conservation servitudes is not without cost and may well prove 
expensive and difficult.61  I also suggest that there is a certain 
 
58 Cf. BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, SOCIAL JUSTICE IN THE LIBERAL STATE 215–19 
(1980) (arguing that among the benefits of a liberal arts education is the capacity to 
make informed guesses about what goods and services will contribute to future 
social welfare). 
59 See Roger E. Meiners & Dominic P. Parker, Legal and Economic Issues in 
Private Land Conservation, 44 NAT. RESOURCES J. 353, 353 (2004); see also Barton 
H. Thompson, Jr., The Trouble with Time: Influencing the Conservation Choices of 
Future Generations, 44 NAT. RESOURCES J. 601, 603 (2004). 
60 See supra notes 38–42 and accompanying text. 
61 See Mahoney, supra note 8, at 595–99; see generally MICHAEL HELLER, THE 
GRIDLOCK ECONOMY: HOW TOO MUCH OWNERSHIP WRECKS MARKETS, STOPS  
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irony in this blithe disregard for the risk of institutional gridlock.  
If it is true, as many philosophers, legal scholars, and 
policymakers argue, that the interests of future generations place 
moral constraints on our behavior,62 then surely we should be 
alert to all the actions we might engage in that might impose 
costs on our successors and not only focus on ones involving 
environmental harms. 
In sum, my chief point is that conservation servitudes do not 
fit well with our need for institutions and practices that can 
adjust with ease to shifting climate and landscape, advances in 
knowledge, and evolving societal norms.  Right now, the 
conservation movement would profit from looking ahead and 
grappling with how modern society and technologies can and 
should interact with ecological systems.63  To undertake this 
project, environmentalism should embrace a nuanced, realistic 
understanding of the relationship between humans and nature, 
one that casts man not simply as a potential despoiler or (at best) 
a preserver of pristine landscapes but as a part of the natural 
 
INNOVATION, AND COSTS LIVES (2008) (detailing the barriers to reassembling 
fragmented property rights).  It bears mention that concerns about the durability of 
preservation measures are by no means pertinent only to conservation servitudes.  
Both command and control regulation and the acquisition of fees simple by 
government and nonprofit entities–the two chief preservation vehicles other than 
conservation servitudes–entail reconfigurations of human created institutional 
arrangements.  As with the imposition of conservation servitudes, these measures 
are not irreversible, but they may prove hard and costly to undo.  See Mahoney, 
supra note 8, at 596.  There are differences.  Most important, in contrast to 
conservation easements, there exist tried and true mechanisms for reversing land 
preservation accomplished through regulation and fee simple acquisition.  
Government entities routinely repeal or revise regulations and conservation 
organizations can and do deaccession lands they own outright.  Nevertheless, the 
key point should not be lost sight of: reconfigurations of human created institutional 
strictures are generally not free and often not simple. 
62 See DANIEL A. FARBER, ECO-PRAGMATISM: MAKING SENSIBLE 
ENVIRONMENTAL DECISIONS IN AN UNCERTAIN WORLD 154–55 (1999); see also 
JOEL FEINBERG, The Rights of Animals and Unborn Generations, in RIGHTS, 
JUSTICE, AND THE BOUNDS OF LIBERTY: ESSAYS IN SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY 159 
(1980). 
63 See THOMAS P. HUGHES, HUMAN-BUILT WORLD: HOW TO THINK ABOUT 
TECHNOLOGY AND CULTURE 153–56 (2004) (arguing that “people in the 
industrialized nations, especially the United States, do not grasp the large range of 
possibilities for creative action that technology offers” and have consequently failed 
to take full advantage of opportunities to create and maintain “aesthetically 
pleasing and ecologically sustainable environments”). 
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world with the capacity to help create ecological value.64  Instead 
it squanders precious energies on the almost certainly futile 
objective of enshrining existing preferences and attitudes. 
The results of this approach are disquieting to contemplate.  
Large swathes of land, including many acres near densely 
inhabited areas, are designated as permanent farms, ranches, 
and forests, even though history teaches that long-term land use 
planning has an extremely poor track record.65  Land trusts and 
easement donors not only fail to express any misgivings about 
their plans to control the future but exult in their powers66 and 
resort to exaggerated claims about the detrimental consequences 
and irreversibility of development to defend their aggressive 
conservation programs.67  And the welfare of future generations, 
which features so heavily in the rhetoric employed to justify land 




To call for a revised mindset that incorporates, rather than 
ignores, the phenomenon of continual change in both nature and 
human society is easy.  What is hard is to construct organizations 
and institutions that take account of the limits of our capacity to 
foretell the future.  It is understandable that, to date, land trusts 
and other promoters of conservation servitudes have shied away 
 
64 See TED NORDHAUS & MICHAEL SHELLENBERGER, BREAK THROUGH: 
FROM THE DEATH OF ENVIRONMENTALISM TO THE POLITICS OF POSSIBILITY 7–
16 (2007) (suggesting that the paradigm that “defines ecological problems as the 
inevitable consequence of humans violating nature” is flawed and that the 
environmental movement should instead emphasize the ability of humans to 
harness new technologies and ecological knowledge to improve the environment). 
65 See JESSE DUKEMINIER, ET AL., PROPERTY 840 (Aspen Publishers 6th ed. 
2006) (tracing the failure of comprehensive plans by local governments that 
proceeded “on the assumption that an area could be mapped, once and for all, with 
few changes necessary thereafter”). 
66 See, e.g., BREWER, supra note 55. 
67 See Mahoney, supra note 4, at 763–67. 
68 Cf. Douglas A. Kysar, The Consultants’ Republic, 121 HARV. L. REV. 2041, 
2083 (2008) (“Can the other remote beneficiaries of environmental law’s protection 
. . . be made to appear within the liberal democratic framework as legal subjects in 
themselves, rather than merely as objects of valuation by presently living 
[actors]?”). 
 2008] Land Preservation and Institutional Design 449 
from this difficult enterprise, preferring instead to assume that 
today’s conservation decisions will turn out to be good ones.  But 
a true commitment to the welfare of future generations demands 
a more realistic approach. 
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